Paradigms for the Compellence of Space Victory

ABSTRACT

Existing U.S. military spacepower is valued for the support it provides to terrestrially-focused defense forces. Missing from doctrine is the likelihood of space forces choosing to pursue independent action in the space domain in order to coerce an enemy to submit. Developing strategies for attaining victory via actions in space expands a nation’s potential to defend its interests, frustrate those of its adversaries, and mitigate human casualties. The inability to evolve space forces to focus beyond support roles to terrestrial-focused forces leaves the United States vulnerable to attack in space. The U.S. Space Force should consider ways to achieve strategic coercion by targeting space assets especially given Russia’s formal threats to U.S. commercial space spacecraft. This paper explores general guidelines for such strategies and examines two general methods: a military spacecraft targeting approach and a commercial spacecraft targeting approach. Either of these could be executed by the United States’ adversaries in the near-future, and their potential coercive value will grow over time.

Introduction

At its founding, the U.S. Air Force inherited the interwar enthusiasm for pursuing victory directly via strategic bombing not serving as a support service to ground forces.[1] In hindsight, this separate domain focused doctrine was revolutionary considering that land, air, and sea are all interconnected terrestrial domains. In contrast, the early years of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) have featured much debate over whether the service’s primary role ought to be primarily to provide support to terrestrial forces or also pursue victory directly in the space domain.[2] 

Spacepower enhances terrestrial forces by providing intelligence; communication; and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities. A predisposition to consider the celestial as a secondary theatre to the terrestrial is understandable. The limitations of airpower were exposed throughout the second half of the 20th century over Vietnam and Yugoslavia – these conflicts serve as a cautionary tale for those who would consider achieving victory independent of ground forces.[3] However, it would be dangerous to assume the same story would play out in space. USSF doctrine lists “provide independent options” in, from, and to space as a cornerstone responsibility.[4] The service should not view this merely as a responsibility to achieve extremely limited objectives or contribute to coercion in a small way. America’s adversaries may not hold such views in the future. Paradigms for the imposition of a nation’s will upon the enemy by violence inflicted solely in the space domain should be considered. Counterforce (targeting military spacecraft) and countervalue (targeting commercial spacecraft) strategies could theoretically lead to victory without extending the conflict to the Earth, avoiding unnecessary loss of life.

Winning Wars

According to Clausewitzian theory, the object of war as compelling the enemy to do one’s will.[5] This outcome is sometimes achieved by the complete annihilation of the enemy as an independent entity and the direct imposition of the will onto the defenseless population or territory, such as occurred in Carthage in 146 BC or in Saigon in 1975 AD.[6] This is not a suitable approach for space forces because any nation in the future will only have a small fraction of its people and possessions in space. A more feasible design consists of inflicting costs upon an enemy until the enemy decides that doing the will of the victor is more palatable than continuing the struggle.[7] Consider the eventual British conclusion that granting the 13 American Colonies independence was preferable to carrying on the fight against the Revolution.[8] Although not aiming at the complete overthrow of the enemy, this cost imposition is no longer mere peacetime deterrence seeking the maintenance of the status quo, it is true compellence seeking a change in enemy behavior.

It is the threat of future punitive action in this second form of compellence which is truly coercive.[9] Suffering already endured and survived will not cause a rational enemy to abandon the fight if no more suffering is expected to follow. Should an attack be absorbed, and there be no prospect of future assaults, the defender will not rush to make sacrifices of land or interests in exchange for peace, because a de facto peace has already been secured without the need for further concessions.

The attacker must hold at risk something which the enemy’s decision-makers value. Should the winning side find themselves capable of easily annihilating a whole division in the field unless their leader surrenders, yet the enemy’s decision-maker has little regard for human life, threatening to destroy the leader’s beloved mansion instead may carry more immediate coercive value. Alternatively, costs can be imposed on the other two legs of the Clausewitzian trinity besides the government: the military and the people.[10] A disgruntled military can pressure their government to agree to a surrender. A disgruntled population can rise in a popular revolt against the conflict. A government wary of these eventualities can sue for peace when otherwise they would not, finding their grip on power indirectly threatened by the enemy.

Outlining Victory in Space

Julian Corbett considered an offense form the “positive form” of warfare for its ability to seize the initiative and threaten war-winning cost imposition.[11] In contrast to this, defense is often held to be the “stronger form.”[12] Units on the defensive may be entrenched and need only to parry blows rather than deliver them. 

Defensive strategies are only coercive insofar as they contain a counteroffensive as their goal.[13] Any strategy for achieving victory in space must be an offensively minded one. For example, once the enemy is weakened and his own offensive has culminated, the defender switches to the offensive and forcing a retreat. Should the defender not even threaten such an action, the attacker will have no incentive at all to agree to terms, as the enemy can keep what was gained and prepare for further offensives without the threat of attack. 

The offensive is arguably the “stronger form” of warfare in the space domain especially given the advantages of first-move and how the domain alters after the first strike.[14] On land, defenders can “await the blow” in a hidden and protected position, forcing the attacker reveal himself first and fight from an exposed position.[15] As a domain, space lacks the cover and concealment which makes this approach possible. Positional advantages may be obtained by stationing spacecraft at higher altitudes where they have time to react to ground-based attacks, but this is little help against co-orbital threats.[16] The ability to exploit maneuver may be more vital to success than positioning.[17] Given equal resources, an attacker focused on maneuvering to engage targets above all else is likely to succeed against a defender whose focus is split between providing services to the Earth and maneuvering to evade attack. This makes deterrence by denial in the domain more difficult, while incentivizing a coercion-based approach.[18]

It follows that space forces desiring to coerce an enemy into submission ought to pursue a fundamentally offensive strategy. This strategy should be designed to compel enemy decision makers toward surrender either directly or indirectly via accounting for the influence of the military and populace. This outcome is accomplished by creating the threat of future cost imposition. The strategy should account for failure by providing a path forward for both space and terrestrial follow-on operations in specific if the enemy’s resolve be greater or the defense stouter than anticipated. Given these guidelines, two overarching approaches can be considered: counterforce and countervalue.

Counterforce

In this context, a counterforce strategy would be one which targets the enemy’s space capabilities with the goal of leaving that enemy vulnerable to terrestrial attack. This would involve an overwhelming offensive which degrades the enemy’s ability to project power into a region abroad via attacks on critical support assets, such as intelligence, communications, and PNT spacecraft. Enemy counterspace assets may be engaged as necessary to ensure supremacy. This “space Pearl Harbor,” if accompanied by an ultimatum which threatens a ground, aerial, or maritime offensive against the now unsupported terrestrial forces, may be enough to persuade a space-dependent enemy to capitulate before a terrestrial fight. The space offensive against military forces results in a vulnerability to be exploited by terrestrial forces to impose costs on the enemy’s military and interests. The enemy then relents to avoid this exploitation.

This approach is appealing for several reasons. For one, the space battle of order does not include any people – that is there are no human expeditionary forces, infantry-like forces, human-crewed vessels or craft. As no human lives are lost, the defender’s population is less likely to become enraged by this attack and demand war. For similar reasons, neutral nations are less likely to feel obliged to militarily support the defender. Attackers prefer strategies that reduce the chance of human loss because it decreases the likelihood of popular dissent at home and mitigates reprisals. Should this approach fail to end the war before resorting to terrestrial combat, the initiator will be at an advantage in such combat.

There are several keys to achieving success in this manner. First, the advantage must not be overexploited in the ultimatum or negotiations. The enemy must determine that fighting a terrestrial conflict at a disadvantage is not worth avoiding the sacrifice of interests being demanded. 

Second, permanent means of disablement ought to be used when pursuing this strategy. Reversible means (i.e. electromagnetic warfare) may play a tactical role in achieving a successful large-scale space assault but would be insufficient for the strategic task in isolation. The objective is to move the enemy to despair and defeatism, believing they must seek an undesirable peace rather than suffer an inevitably destructive terrestrial attack. The permanent destruction of many spacecraft, which cannot at present be quickly reconstituted, is preferable to deception, disruption, denial, or degradation for creating such a psychological effect. Mass use of reversible effects alone risks encouraging the enemy to delay acceptance of the ultimatum while searching for a tactic to overcome the interference. Nevertheless, the scale of the attack must be proportionate to the military objectives sought and, if the selected means of disablement would result in debris generation, the attacker must consider the legal and strategic implications of any collateral effects.

Third, the attacker must carefully select targets relevant to this strategy. Targeting civilian spacecraft, such as satellites providing television, would not contribute to the degradation of the enemy’s military potential, would violate the Law of Armed Conflict which requires distinction, and may risk negatively affecting public opinion. Commanders must exercise sound judgement in engaging dual-use spacecraft. Such satellites would only be legitimate targets if they are directly participating in the conflict and then generally, only for the duration of that direct participation. In any case, it may be wise to make an exception to the use of permanent means of disablement for certain dual-use targets; offering to restore them to functionality after peace is concluded could be a carrot complementing the sticks in negotiations.

Last, certain military satellites may be left off target lists entirely. If enemy intelligence collection is completely neutered, the enemy may be incapable of verifying the possibility of threatened future attacks and could opt to call the attacker’s bluff. If strategic (i.e. nuclear) communications nodes are destroyed, the enemy’s decision-makers may be denied vital information and could be inclined to lash out in existential fear. Targets should be selected to cripple regional forces without disrupting all enemy information gathering and dissemination or unduly raising the ire of the enemy’s population.

Countervalue

In contrast to the counterforce strategy, which pressures the enemy’s government via costs imposed on his military, the countervalue approach would apply pressure via costs imposed on the populace. Should a nation’s economy and way of life be dependent upon space for things such as navigation, commerce, finance, communication, and entertainment, a type of coercion via orbital blockade may be deployed against it. Counterspace assets may again be engaged as needed to ensure operational freedom, but the main targets would be commercial spacecraft. Like with any other blockade, the objective would be to force the adversary to make concessions to avoid economic downturn and a disgruntled population. This approach would often violate the legal principle of distinction by making civilian objects, the services provided to noncombatants, or both the primary targets, but this may not dissuade certain nations that do not heed the rules-based international order, from pursuing this strategy.

Like the counterforce strategy though, this approach may be appealing for those wishing to avoid loss of life. Similar to economic sanctions, it could be used to coerce short of what some would consider open conflict, such as how Russia is currently disrupting satellite navigation services in the Baltics.[19] Although it would not create ideal conditions for follow-on actions like the counterforce strategy, the “blockader” could still enter any successive conflict with dominance of the enemy’s celestial lines of communication (CLOCs) due to actions taken during the blockade.

Nations must carefully pursue a countervalue strategy. If the objective is to coerce short of open warfare, military targets such as missile warning or intelligence assets should be left untouched. Engaging them may spark undesired escalation. Targets should be engaged via reversible means, if possible. Should many spacecraft be destroyed under this strategy, the enemy gains little by acquiescing to his blockader’s will. Once the “merchant fleet” is sunk, the lifting of the blockade offers nothing; no goods will be shipped in any case. Even if permanent means are used, debris generation should be avoided to prevent collateral damage to friendly, neutral, or untargeted enemy satellites. 

In addition to the above concepts, the attacker may choose to execute the strategy in stages, first establishing supremacy over the enemy’s CLOCs, then denying the enemy’s people use of certain spacecraft, then expanding the number of assets targeted over time. This would demonstrate resolve and ability while offering the enemy an opportunity to avoid perceived significant costs by relenting early. Alternatively, one must be wary fine-tuning to a point where the enemy is able to constantly adjust to the new level each time. For example, the failures of Rolling Thunder over North Vietnam suffice to demonstrate the risks of underestimating the value of shock and discounting an enemy’s resolve.[20]

Future Prospects

Both the counterforce and countervalue strategies require a nation to be able to exercise space superiority, if not supremacy. In the counterforce approach, space superiority must be decisively seized, even if only for a short time or over a specific region, and then ruthlessly exploited. In the countervalue strategy, the demand is even greater. Supremacy over enemy CLOCs must be established and maintained over an extended period, while executing restraint to avoid escalation, against an enemy who need only avoid or workaround the disruptions. A nation seeking to execute these strategies must first cultivate a powerful space force with sound doctrine, strong tactics, and aggressively minded guardians.

These approaches can only compel a space-dependent enemy. Spacepower may provide support to terrestrial forces which allows them to dominate non-spacefaring enemies but, just as independent naval action can do little to compel the landlocked, independent space action can do little to compel the Earth-bound. The power of the counterforce strategy grows as militaries become reliant upon space effects. Likewise, as commercial sectors embrace more space services, the power of the countervalue strategy grows. The ability for spacepower alone to coerce will increase exponentially as humanity begins to live and work in space in numbers, or extract space resources in bulk.

Until then, however, the value of space-based compellence remains limited. These strategies are best employed against an enemy’s peripheral interests, in specific where these oppose the attacker’s core interests, giving the attacker an advantage in resolve. It remains unlikely that spacefaring nations would sacrifice their own territory without a terrestrial fight, but defeat in space may convince them to sacrifice an ally’s territory before incurring inevitable loss of life.

China and Russia may be most able to execute such strategies against the United States, and they possess reasonably powerful space forces.[21] The United States is critically reliant upon space militarily and commercially.[22] Russia and China seek to contest peripheral U.S. interests in Eastern Europe and Taiwan, which Russia and China perceive as core interests, respectively.[23] U.S. adversaries have little concern for international law as demonstrated by Russia in Ukraine and China in the South China Sea.[24] Their execution of the counterforce strategy could be unburdened by a need for a just cause or by a requirement to minimize collateral damage. Likewise, their targeting in a countervalue strategy could be unencumbered by restrictions on engaging civilian spacecraft. They have capability, opportunity, and resolve. Thus, the USSF must prepare to counter such approaches.

In addition, the United States is also poised to achieve strategic effects via an independent use of spacepower. The United States is considered to be the most powerful of the spacefaring nations in the domain and the USSF’s independence should allow it to cultivate the requisite doctrine, tactics, and mindset. Further, its main adversaries, Russia and China, are spacefaring nations which integrate space support into their military operations as well as their economies, leaving them vulnerable to coercion via space. 

Conclusion

Military forces exist to impose a nation’s will upon its enemies. Space forces are no different. The USSF accomplishes this by providing organized, trained, and equipped space forces to combatant commanders in support of terrestrial forces. In the future, spacepower may be wielded to create strategic coercion independent of terrestrial action. Should the USSF neglect to plan for this, it may miss an opportunity to further U.S. interests or, worse, the United States may find itself as the nation being coerced.

Second Lieutenant Alexander R. Kleitz, USSF, is a distinguished graduate of the United States Air Force Academy currently serving as a Space Operations Officer assigned to the 8th Combat Training Squadron at Schriever Space Force Base. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or the United States Space Force. If you have a different perspective, we’d like to hear from you.

[1] Tilford, Earl. 1991. Setup. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2-8.

[2] Perkowski, Leon. 2021. “Conservative vs. Bold Thinking in Spacepower Theory?” War Room - US Army War College. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/spacepower-theory/.

Sinclair, Michael. “Is Space Force Meant to ‘Look down’ or ‘Look out’? Titles Will Tell.” Brookings Institution, September 16, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-space-force-meant-to-look-down-or-look-out-titles-will-tell/.

[3] Clark, Paul Leo. 2013. “Has “Strategic” Airpower Failed to Live up to its Promise?” E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/30/has-strategic-airpower-failed-to-live-up-to-its-promise/.

[4] Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower (Headquarters United States Space Force, June 2020), 28, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/19/2002924108/-1/-1/0/SPACE%20CAPSTONE%20PUBLICATION%20(10%20AUG%202020%20-%20AS%20RELEASED%20BY%20CSO).PDF.

[5] Clausewitz, Carl von. 2008. On War. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 13.

[6] Tilford, 280.

[7] Ibid. 15.

[8] Bullion, John L. 1994. “George III on Empire, 1783” The William and Mary Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946866.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. 30.

[11] Corbett, Julian. 2018. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Monee, IL: Adansonia Publishing, 15.

[12] Clausewitz, 24.

[13] Corbett, 17.

[14] Klein, John. 2006. Space Warfare. New York, NY: Routledge, 75

[15] Clausewitz, 159.

[16] Klein, 75.

[17] Shaw, John, et al. 2023. “Dynamic Space Operations” Aether Journal. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Journals/Special-Edition_Winter2023/Shaw.pdf.

[18] Goodman, Brian R. “Offensive Dominance in Space” Aether Journal. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Journals/Volume-3_Number-1/Goodman.pdf. 

[19] Milne, Richard. “Russian GPS Jamming Threatens Air Disaster, Warn Baltic Ministers.” www.ft.com. Accessed May 4, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/37776b16-0b92-4a23-9f90-199d45d955c3.

[20] Tilford, 154-155.

[21] Space Threat Assessment 2023 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2023), 8-20, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2023.

[22] Defense Space Strategy Summary (Department of Defense, June 2020), 3, available at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF?source=email.

[23] Russian Views of the International Order (RAND Corporation, 2017), 10-11, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1826.html. 

The U.S. Army in Asia, 2030–2040 (RAND Corporation, 2014), 13 available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR474.html.

[24] Kuok, Lynn. “How China’s Actions in the South China Sea Undermine the Rule of Law.” Brookings Institution, November 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-chinas-actions-in-the-south-china-sea-undermine-the-rule-of-law/. 

MacDonald, Justin. 2023. “Russian War Abuses in Ukraine: A Lesson in Legitimacy” War Room - US Army War College. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/legitimacy/.